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Abstract
Observing that the creation of certain types of artistic ar-
tifacts necessitate intelligence, we present the Lovelace
2.0 Test of creativity as an alternative to the Turing Test
as a means of determining whether an agent is intel-
ligent. The Lovelace 2.0 Test builds off prior tests of
creativity and additionally provides a means of directly
comparing the relative intelligence of different agents.
Introduction
Alan Turing proposed the Imitation Game—later referred
to as the Turing Test—as a lens through which to exam-
ine the question of whether a machine can be considered
to think (Turing 1950). The Turing Test was never meant
to be conducted; indeed many practical methodological de-
tails are left absent Regardless of Turing’s intent, the Tur-
ing Test has been adopted as a rigorous test of the intel-
ligence capability of computational systems. Occasionally,
researchers make claims that the the test has been passed.
The most recent claim involved a chatbot using simple tem-
plate matching rules. One of the weaknesses of the Turing
Test as a diagnostic tool for intelligence is its reliance on
deception (Levesque, Davis, and Morgenstern 2012); agents
that are successful at the Turing Test and the closely related
Loebner Prize Competition are those that fool human judges
for short amounts of time partially by evading the judges’
questions.
A number of alternative tests of intelligence
have been proposed including Winograd Schemas
(Levesque, Davis, and Morgenstern 2012), question-
answering in the context of a television show, and a robot
that gives a talk at the TED conference. Bringsjord, Bello,
and Ferrucci (2001) proposed the Lovelace Test, in which
an intelligent system must originate a creative concept
or work of art. For certain types of creative acts, such as
fabricating novel, fictional stories, it can be argued that a
creative computational system must possess many of the
cognitive capabilities of humans.
In this paper, we propose an updated Lovelace Test as an
alternative to the Turing Test. The original Lovelace Test,
described in the next section, is thought to be unbeatable.
The new Lovelace Test proposed in this paper asks an artifi-
cial agent to create a wide range of types of creative artifacts
(e.g., paintings, poetry, stories, etc.) that meet requirements
given by a human evaluator. The Lovelace 2.0 Test is a test
of the creative ability of a computational system, but the cre-
ation of certain types of artifacts, such as stories, require a
wide repertoire of human-level intelligent capabilities.
Background
Ada Lovelace (1843) notes that “the Analytical Engine has
no pretensions to originate anything. It can do whatever we
know how to order it to perform” (note G). Turing (1950)
refutes the charge that computing machines cannot originate
concepts and reframes the question as whether a machine
can never “take us by surprise.”
The original Lovelace Test
(Bringsjord, Bello, and Ferrucci 2001) attempts to for-
malize the notion of origination and surprise. An artificial
agent a, designed by h, passes the Lovelace Test if and only
if:
• a outputs o,
• a’s outputting o is the result of processes a can repeat and
not a fluke hardware error, and
• h (or someone who knows what h knows and has h’s re-
sources) cannot explain how a produced o.
One critique of the original Lovelace Test is that it is un-
beatable; any entity h with resources to build a in the first
place and with sufficient time also has the ability to explain
o. Even learning systems cannot beat the test because one
can deduce the data necessary to produce o.
Computational creativity is the art, science, philosophy,
and engineering of computational systems that, by taking on
particular responsibilities, exhibit behaviors that unbiased
observers would deem to be creative. There are no conclu-
sive tests of whether a computational system exhibits cre-
ativity. Boden (2004) proposes that creative systems be able
to produce artifacts that are valuable, novel, and surprising.
Unfortunately, it is not clear how to measure these attributes.
Boden describes surprise, in particular, as the experience of
realizing something one believed to be highly improbable
has in fact occurred. Automated story generation is the fab-
rication of fictional stories by an artificial agent and has been
an active area in computational creativity. The strong story
hypothesis (Winston 2011) states that story understanding
and story telling play a central role in human intelligence.
The Lovelace 2.0 Test
We propose a test designed to challenge the premise that a
computational system can originate a creative artifact. We
believe that a certain subset of creative acts necessitates
human-level intelligence, thus rendering both a test of cre-
ativity and also a test of intelligence.
The Lovelace 2.0 Test is as follows: artificial agent a is
challenged as follows:
• a must create an artifact o of type t;
• o must conform to a set of constraints C where ci ∈ C is
any criterion expressible in natural language;
• a human evaluator h, having chosen t and C, is satisfied
that o is a valid instance of t and meets C; and
• a human referee r determines the combination of t and C
to not be unrealistic for an average human.
The constraints set C makes the test Google-proof and resis-
tant to Chinese Room arguments. An evaluator is allowed to
impose as many constraints as he or she deems necessary to
ensure that the system produces a novel and surprising arti-
fact. For example: “tell a story in which a boy falls in love
with a girl, aliens abduct the boy, and the girl saves the world
with the help of a talking cat.” While C does not necessarily
need to be expressed in natural language, the set of possible
constraints must be equivalent to the set of all concepts that
can be expressed by a human mind. The ability to correctly
respond to the given set of constraints C is a strong indicator
of intelligence.
The evaluation of the test is simple: a human evaluator is
allowed to choose t and C and determine whether the resul-
tant artifact is an example of the given type and whether it
satisfactorily meets all the constraints. Aesthetic valuations
are not considered; the artifact need only be deemed to meet
C and at need not be better than what an average unskilled
human can achieve.
The human referee r is necessary to prevent the situation
where the evaluator presents the agent with a combination
of t and C that might be extremely difficult to meet even by
humans. The referee should be an expert on t who can veto
judge inputs based on his or her expert opinion on what is
known about t and average human abilities.
With a little bit of additional methodology, the Lovelace
2.0 Test can be used to quantify the creativity of an artifi-
cial agent, allowing for the comparison of different systems.
Suppose there is a set H of human evaluators, each of which
performs a sequence of Lovelace Tests, k = 1...ni, such that
|Ck| = k and ni is the first test at which the agent fails to
meet the criteria given by evaluator hi ∈ H . That is, each
evaluator runs the Lovelace Test where the kth test has k
constraints and stops administering tests after the first time
the agent fails the test. The creativity of the artificial agent
can be expressed as the mean number of challenges passed:∑
i
(ni)/|H |. With a sufficiently large |H |, one should get
a good idea of the capabilities of the system, although fu-
ture work may be necessary to measure the difficulty of any
given set of constraints.
The Lovelace 2.0 Test is a means of evaluating the creativ-
ity of an agent with respect to well-defined types of artifacts.
The proposed test can also act as a test of intelligence in
the case of types of artifacts that require human-level intelli-
gence. Consider a limited form of the test: the generation of
fictional stories. Fictional story generation requires a num-
ber of human-level cognitive capabilities including com-
monsense knowledge, planning, theory of mind, affective
reasoning, discourse planning, and natural language pro-
cessing. A story generator is also likely to benefit from fa-
miliarity with, and able to comprehend, existing literature
and cultural artifacts. Currently, no existing story generation
system can pass the Lovelace 2.0 Test because most story
generation systems require a priori domain descriptions.
Open story generation partially addresses this by learning
domain knowledge in a just-in-time fashion (Li et al. 2013),
but cannot yet comprehend nor address complex constraints.
The Lovelace 2.0 Test is designed to encourage skepti-
cism in the human evaluators. Regardless of whether the hu-
man judge is an expert in artificial intelligence or not, the
evaluator is given the chance to craft a set of constraints that
he or she would expect the agent to be unable to meet. Thus
if the judge is acting with the intent to disprove the intelli-
gence, the judge should experience an element of surprise
if the agent passes a challenge. The ability to repeat the test
with more or harder constraints enables the judge to test the
limits of the agent’s intelligence. These features are at the
expense of a halting condition—the test provides no thresh-
old at which one can declare an artificial agent to be intel-
ligent. However, the test provides a means to quantitatively
compare artificial agents. Creativity is not unique to human
intelligence, but it is one of the hallmarks of human intelli-
gence. Many forms of creativity necessitate intelligence. In
the spirit of the Imitation Game, the Lovelace 2.0 Test asks
that artificial agents comprehend instruction and create at the
amateur levels.
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